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Abstract
Recent developments in society have generated misalignment between the
welfare state and socio-economic conditions and preferences. This paper emphasis
developments in the labor market and the structure, stability and preferences of the
family, as well as macroeconomic changes. The latter include new patterns of short-
term macroeconomic instability, economic growth and the internationalization of
national economies. I deal both with developments that are exogenous from the point
of view of the welfare state and with developments that may be regarded as
endogenous behavior adjustments of individuals in response to the welfare state itself.
Alternative welfare-state reforms are also considered.
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–A nE s s a y–
The welfare state is an inheritance from political responses to changes in
socioeconomic conditions and preferences in the past. But the situation today is very different
from that which prevailed when the welfare state was constructed. Still, it has turned out to be
difficult to adjust welfare-state arrangements to new circumstances. The ensuing misalign-
ment between the welfare state and contemporary conditions is the background for current
discussions of welfare-state reforms. These are the issues focused on in this essay.
The socioeconomic background of the welfare state is well known. Industrialization
meant that periods of work and non-work became more discrete and more random events
than before (Piore, 1987; Atkinson, 1991). The resulting temporal desynchronization of an
individual’s consumption requirements and actual income flows created a need (justification)
for new arrangements to reallocate income over his life cycle and to protect him against
income risks. At the same time, urbanization reduced the family’s ability to satisfy these
needs, partly because family members of different generations often became separated
geographically. Nor could the family alone satisfy the increased need for education and
health care in industrial and urban societies. It is also well known that voluntary market
solutions could not live up to these new needs because of myopic behavior and free riding of
individuals, and because of well-known limitations in private insurance markets as a result of
adverse selection, cream skimming, and moral hazard. This, of course, is the background for
the (reasonable) assertion that the welfare state can be justified not only on distributional
(social) grounds but also with reference to efficiency aspects (Barr, 1992). Moreover, we may
speculate that destitution among minorities and specific individuals has become less socially
acceptable over time. In this sense, social (political) preferences may have changed, perhaps
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to some extent as a result of higher income and more widespread education. Meanwhile we
may quarrel about whether social preferences of this type reflect altruism or “enlightened
self-interest”.
Macroeconomic instability in an industrial society, not least the depression in the
1930s, highlighted the need for income protection. Moreover, rapid economic growth during
the first decades after World War II created the necessary economic resources to satisfy these
needs to a considerable degree. Indeed, during these decades, welfare-state arrangements in
many developed countries gradually changed from poverty relief and basic (“minimum”)
income support to broad income-maintenance programs and further expansion of tax-
financed services in education and health. A number of socioeconomic features during the
early postwar decades also contributed to making the welfare state both financially viable and
reasonably well adjusted to the new needs. These features include a rather homogeneous
labor force, full employment (mainly for men), quite stable families and favorable
demography (a large fraction of the population of working age).
General franchise provided political channels through which the new needs could
gradually be translated into concrete action, even though embryos of welfare-state
arrangements already existed. When the modern welfare state was basically completed in the
1970s, it was mainly adopted to the needs of “standard” families with a male breadwinner
and a housewife, though it also provided special arrangements to mitigate poverty for
individuals and families without a regularly employed income earner. In several countries in
Western Europe, job-protection legislation was added, in particular in the 1970s, as a
complement to or a substitute for unemployment benefits and social assistance.
It is well known, however, that socioeconomic changes in recent decades have created
new needs (justifications) for intertemporal reallocation of income and protection against new
types of income risk. These changes have also contributed to new service needs that are not
well met by traditional welfare-state arrangements. As in the case of industrialization and
urbanization a century ago, the most important changes have taken place in the labor market
and the family. Some socioeconomic changes have also undermined the financial viability of
a number of traditional welfare-state arrangements. Important examples are demographic
changes, new macroeconomic developments, including high and persistent unemployment in
Western Europe, secular changes in long-term economic growth and internationalization of
the economic system. I will also argue that the views (“philosophies”) among voters and
politicians about the proper relation between the individual and the state have changed in
recent decades. Important examples are new views about an individual’s responsibility for his
own destiny and about his right and ability to exert free choice among alternative types of
income protection and social services.3
Several driving forces behind these developments may be regarded as exogenous
from the point of view of the welfare state. Obvious examples are new technologies,
advances in medicine and increased international economic integration. Other driving forces
– including changes in demography, cohabitation patterns and the life cycle of individuals –
are most realistically regarded as combined results of exogenous events and endogenous
behavioral adjustments of individuals in response to the welfare state itself, including the
effects of economic (dis)incentives associated with benefits and taxes.
In some countries, the dynamics of the political process may also have generated an
“overshooting” of the welfare state, in the sense that voters would have chosen smaller
aggregate welfare-state spending if incentives for political action had been more symmetric
between beneficiaries and taxpayers. As argued by many observers, since benefits are often
selective while taxes are usually general, the incentives of individuals belonging to special
interest groups to exert political pressure for new favors are often stronger than the incentives
of the general taxpayer to resist such favors. I have hypothesized elsewhere (Lindbeck, 1985
and 1994) that the recursive and incremental nature of the political decision-making process
tends to accentuate this tendency, since different programs are no longer weighted against
each other simultaneously.
When discussing these issues, it is important to keep in mind that economic behavior
is influenced not only by economic incentives but also by social norms and individual ethics
(internalized norms). In particular, I will hypothesize that norms inherited from the past often
constrain the (dis)incentive effects in the short run. In a long-term perspective, however,
these norms themselves may adjust in response to changes in economic incentives (Lindbeck,
1995). If this hypothesis is correct, the incentive effects of welfare-state arrangements, and
their financing, would in some cases be stronger in the long run than in a short- and medium-
term perspective. Such behavioral inertia may accentuate the earlier mentioned tendency to
”overshoot” aggregate welfare-state spending since it is difficult for policymakers and voters
to predict induced long-term changes in social norms when new welfare-state programs are
launched.
These new developments constitute the background for this essay on “changing tides”
for the welfare state. Both exogenous disturbances and endogenous behavioral adjustments
are then considered. I discuss quite different “welfare regimes”, hence different relative roles
of the state, the family and the market for economic security and personal services.
Misalignment between the welfare state and social conditions does not mean that
today’s welfare-state arrangements have become obsolete or that voters turn their backs on
the welfare state. According to opinion polls, the welfare state is still quite popular, even
though there are specific complaints, and popular support for some narrowly targeted4
welfare-state programs is often rather weak (Taylor-Gooby, 1996; Boeri, Börsch-Supan and
Tabellini, 2000). But as we shall see, new socioeconomic developments and changes in
values help explain why proposals for welfare-state reform abound and why some such
reforms have already been initiated in a number of countries.
I begin by discussing changes in the labor market (section 1). Next, I deal with
changes in the structure and stability of the family (section 2). The reason for focusing on
these two institutions – the labor market and the family – is that they, alongside the public
sector, are the basic providers of income and personal services, and hence well-being of
individuals. I then turn to contemporary changes in the macroeconomy with important
consequences for the functioning of the welfare state (section 3). Here, I deal with three
macroeconomic features – short-term macroeconomic instability, economic growth and the
internationalization of national economies. Some concluding remarks are offered in section 4.
1. Structural Changes in the Labor Market
1.1 Labor supply
What then are the most important examples of “changing tides” in the labor market
from the point of view of the welfare state? With respect to labor supply, it is a commonplace
that the aging of the population – a combined result of the baby boom in the 1940s, low birth
rates since the 1970s and increasing longevity after retirement – threatens the financial
viability of the welfare state, in particular the pension system. Indeed, birth rates in most
European countries today are considerably below the reproduction level. The average birth
rate in Western Europe (the number of children born divided by the average number of
women of fertile cohorts) was only 1.47 in 1998 (U.S. Bureau of the Census). Life
expectancy at age 65 in Western Europe has increased by slightly more than one year per
decade after World War II, ranging from somewhat less than one year per decade in the
Netherlands to more than 1.5 year per decade in France (United Nations Demographic
Yearbook, 1949, 1960 and 1997). Instead of 45-50 years of work and 5-10 years of retirement
half a century ago, a typical young individual today can expect to work for 30-35 years and
be retired for about 17 years (OECD, 1998a).
1
Most likely, the fall in birth rates is related to the higher costs of raising children
(reflecting higher real wages) and the increased labor-force participation of females (Becker,
1981). Some welfare-state arrangements have also contributed to the fall in birth rates since it
has become less important than earlier to have children in order to support oneself in old age;
1 According to projections by the EU Secretariat, the rules in effect in the early 1990s imply that the average
age-dependency ratio (the number of retirees relative to the number of individuals of working age) will increase
by 50 percent between the mid-1990s and 2020 in the EU area (European Community, 1994).5
pay-go pension systems, for instance, imply that the children of other families support me
when I grow old. Government subsidies to education have also delayed the entry of
individuals into the labor force. This has reduced the number of taxpayers, though the related
accumulation of human capital per individual, and hence increased labor productivity, have
counteracted (perhaps even reversed) the negative effects on the tax base. Welfare-state
arrangements have also contributed to the rise in the number of pensioners via a lower
statutory retirement age and more generous subsidies to early retirement. Moreover,
subsidized health care is likely to have contributed to the rise in longevity. Government
spending on pensions has been boosted by a tendency among politicians to add new types of
benefits to existing pension systems, for instance, by allotting pension rights for compulsory
military service, unemployment periods, the care of children, etc. These new costs have
added to unavoidable cost increases in connection with the gradual “maturing” of pay-go
pensions systems.
Since better health among elderly citizens usually enhances their ability to work, it
may not be too far-fetched to deal with the financial difficulties of the pension system by
raising the age of mandatory retirement (the “statutory” retirement age) or by reducing the
subsidies for early retirement, or both. As an illustration of the potential importance of the
latter type of reform, in the late 1990s, average labor-force participation in the EU in the 55-
65 age group was only about 40 percent, ranging from 24 percent in Belgium to 88 percent in
Iceland (OECD, 1999). Without policy actions that raise the average retirement age, it is
obvious that pension schemes in most developed countries will require substantial increases
in pension contributions (if pension benefits are fixed) or reductions in pension benefits (if
the contribution rate is fixed).
The political power of cohorts close to retirement is one conceivable explanation why
it has turned out to be difficult both to increase the statutory retirement age and to reduce
subsidies to early retirement. It is not clear, however, why these cohorts would have such
great political power. Some young and middle-aged individuals, of course, may be happy of
not having to support their own parents individually in the future. Perhaps rather young
cohorts also look forward to early retirement themselves. Indeed, with today’s incentive
structure in favor of early retirement, it is not surprising that a vast majority of individuals are
anxious to retire quite early, often no later than at 60 – at least this is what opinion polls have
found. Moreover, in all West European countries, unions and firms use early retirement, at
the taxpayers’ expense, as a way of cutting the work force in individual firms (when this is
regarded as necessary) at the lowest possible cost to firms. A common argument for such
policy action is that it is believed to reduce aggregate unemployment, which may be true in a
short-term perspective.6
Considering the wide variability in the capacity and willingness to work among the
elderly, there is also a strong case for combining the removal of subsidies to early retirement
with a more flexible retirement age (possibly with actuarial adjustments of yearly pensions).
Elderly workers in poor health could then be referred to the sick or disability insurance
system rather than to the pension system. Another, possibly complementary reform could be
to allow the elderly to continue to work after receiving a pension (without subsidies to early
retirement), hence partly uncoupling retirement and pension. Indeed, this is rather common in
Japan, where employees are often able to continue working at reduced wages after receiving
pensions (without much reduction in the latter) – either by performing new tasks in the same
firm or by shifting to other firms.
Since fairly similar demographic problems exist in most countries in Western Europe,
attempts to mitigate these problems via immigration of young and low middle-age workers
would have to rely on immigrants from Eastern Europe and non-European countries. Though
such immigration certainly makes sense from an economic point of view, we know from
experience that ethnic conflicts may be triggered if the size or speed of immigration exceeds
certain (unknown) limits. This is particularly likely to occur if immigration is thought to
result in downward pressure on the wages of low-skilled workers or upward pressure on
social-assistance spending. Such developments would also complicate the ambitions of
welfare states to mitigate segregation and promote social accord. A likely future strategy of
governments to deal with this issue would be to favor the immigration of skilled rather than
unskilled workers.
Moreover, a shift to a fully funded, actuarially fair pension system may improve the
financial stability of the pension system in the long run. The reason is that pensions would
then be limited to the return on the pension funds. But in a short- and medium-term
perspective such a shift is bound to create new financial problems for the government, since
some “transition generations” would have to pay “twice” – by financing both their own future
pensions and the pension claims of earlier generations of pay-go pensioners.
If individuals perceive only weak links (or no links at all) between contributions and
benefits in an existing pay-go pension system, a shift to a fully funded system means that
future generations will experience less distortion of work, and hence enjoy higher economic
efficiency. This would also tend to improve the financial viability of the pension system via a
larger tax base. But the same effect could, in fact, be achieved by establishing a tight link
between contributions and benefits in the context of pay-go pension systems, provided these
have individual (“notional”) accounts (Lindbeck and Persson, 1999) This means that the main
argument for a shift to a fully funded pension system, rather than to a pay-go system with
strong links between contributions and benefits, is a desire to increase national saving and7
hence the future capital stock (Feldstein, 1995; Kotlikoff, 1998). This is mainly an issue of
reistributionz of income among generations – from current to future generations. Hans-
Werner Sinn (1999) has argued that such a redistribution via forced saving is reasonable from
a normative point of view since contemporary workers have deliberately chosen low fertility
rates, and in this sense been slow in accumulating human capital. They should instead – so
the argument goes – contribute to a faster accumulation of physical capital or financial claims
on other countries via forced saving. Of course, the burden on a “transition generation” may
be reduced if old pay-go pension claims are instead financed by government borrowing rather
than by taxes. But then the desired increase in aggregate national saving may be jeopardized.
The case is stronger for a partial rather than a total shift to a fully funded, actuarially
fair pension system, since diversification of the “portfolio” of pension claims is achieved in
the latter case. Not only does the market risk differ between pay-go and funded pension
systems – risk regarding the development of the tax base in the first system and capital-
market risk in the second. The political risks also differ, and are probably greater in the case
of pay-go systems, since property rights are likely to be stronger in fully funded systems with
individual accounts. By combining the two systems, it would be possible to pool various
types of market risks and political risks, and hence achieve a reduction in total risk (Lindbeck
and Persson, 1999). The emergence of new types of capital-market instruments, which
provide more options regarding the degree of risk exposure, has also strengthened the case
for funded pension systems with individual accounts.
There are, however, political problems in connection with compulsory, funded
pension systems. In particular, how should future politicians be prevented from intervening in
the portfolio management of a pension fund created by the government, and from exercising
voting powers in firms in which the fund has shares – in both cases to exert power or to
influence election outcomes? Capital cannot be nationalized without risking a politicization
of the national economy. The most promising way of minimizing this risk is probably to let
each citizen choose among a number of competing private funds (and possibly also some
competing public-sector fund) even when the pension system is compulsory and when
pension contributions are amassed by the tax collector.
A problem with competing pension funds, of course, is that the dispersion of the
distribution of pension benefits among individuals will be more uneven than with a single
government-operated pension fund, since the latter tends to give the same rate of return to all
individuals in a given cohort. Moreover, the administrative costs are likely to be higher, at
least in countries with a reasonably well-functioning government administration. But
adherents of a pluralistic society may be willing to pay a price, in terms of both greater
dispersion of the distribution of pensions and higher administrative costs, in order to enhance8
the survival of a pluralistic society, since political interventions could then be kept within
bounds.
The rise in labor-force participation of women also has important consequences for
the functioning of the welfare state. The EU average of labor-force participation among adult
females (age 15-64) has increased from 42 percent in 1960 to 58 percent today, ranging from
44 percent in Italy to 75 percent in Denmark (OECD, Historical Statistics, 1960-1995;
Eurostat, 1998a). The background is well known: rationalization of household work,
improved education of females relative to men, fewer children per family and probably also
increased preferences among females for economic and social independence. It is true that
some factors have operated in the opposite direction, hence discouraging female labor-force
participation. In particular, do-it-yourself tasks have been stimulated by the gradual increase
in the relative price of purchased household services, as explained by “Baumol’s law”
(Baumol, 1967). Moreover, in the same way as tariffs favor autarky rather than international
trade for a nation, income and consumption taxes favor autarky for the household (do-it-
yourself) rather than purchases of services in the open market (Lindbeck, 1988). Evidently, in
the case of females, these two negative effects on labor-force participation have been
overridden by the above-mentioned positive effects (in contrast to the case of males).
By boosting the tax base, increased labor-force participation of females obviously
helps finance the welfare state. But it also increases the political pressure for welfare-state
spending aimed at helping individuals, mostly females, to combine family life and working
life. So far, only a few countries, such as the Nordic nations, have developed elaborate
systems of income transfers to families during parental leave and generous subsidies to child
care and old-age care outside the family (OECD, 1998a). This is reflected in employment
statistics. While the public-service sector accounts for about 25 percent of total employment
in the Nordic countries, the average for Western Europe is about 18 percent. (OECD, 1960-
1995). In the United States, where taxes are relatively low and the dispersion of wages
relatively wide, market purchases of such services (including arrangements provided by
employers) are instead relatively large. As a result, while the number of individuals
(officially) engaged in personal services in the private sector is only 5-6 percent of the labor
force in Western Europe, it is about twice as large in the United States (Elfring, 1988, Table
V.3).
Up to a point, subsidies to child care and old-age care outside the household can be
justified on efficiency grounds, since they counteract the earlier mentioned tax distortion in
favor of household work. More specifically, in the case of small families, this tax distortion
discourages the exploitation of returns to scale in child care and old-age care. However, in
some Nordic countries, for instance Sweden, such subsidies are now higher than required to9
compensate for the tax distortion, at least in the case of families with more than one child.
This, of course, means that the government-imposed distortion changes sign.
Subsidized child care outside the household may also promote investment in human
capital, at least for children in families with low income and little education. Indeed, there is
empirical support for this view (Leibowitz, 1996, Heckman 1999). There may also be an
externality argument for subsidies to children in such families, in terms of mitigating social
misbehavior later on in life. The issue becomes more complex, however, if we add political
complications. For instance, it has been observed in many countries that politicians often
have a tendency to combine such subsidies with highly arbitrary rules and costly regulations
about the conduct of child care with respect to the physical premises, including space and
construction, administration, types of toys, curriculum, etc.
An increase in part-time work also has important consequence for the welfare state.
Indeed, part-time work averages about 17 percent of total employment in Western Europe,
ranging from 6 percent in Greece to 39 percent in the Netherlands (Eurostat, 1998b; OECD,
1998b). Part-time work is a rather natural choice among adults with small children. But this
arrangement is accentuated by tax distortions, since progressive taxes with joint assessment
of family income raise the marginal tax rate on the “second” income-earner, who is often a
woman. In some countries, this tax distortion is further accentuated by the construction of the
social-benefit system, as benefits are reduced if the second adult in a family decides to work
longer hours in the open market.
1.2 Labor demand
Recent changes on the labor-demand side are also important for the functioning of the
welfare state. For instance, how can we guarantee that future pension reforms, designed to
boost the labor supply of elderly workers (in the age group 55-70), will actually result in
increased employment rather than higher unemployment for such workers? Economists
typically react to this question by suggesting policies that encourage lower relative wage rates
or reduced payroll taxes for this group of workers. The first alternative is not easy to
implement in the context of collective bargaining because incumbent workers, “insiders”,
who often dominate union policies, may regard such wage adjustments as underbidding of
prevailing wages. As an alternative, the government may encourage elderly workers to sign
individual wage contracts, for instance, by no longer favoring collective bargaining contracts.
But insiders may be able to resist this as well. First, they may have sufficient political clout to
prevent such legislation at the outset. Second, they often have market powers to prevent
individual outsiders from underbidding wages by threatening to harass potential underbidders
or by refusing to cooperate with them in the production process (Lindbeck and Snower,10
1988). Lower payroll taxes for elderly workers are perhaps a more realistic alternative than
lower relative wages as a way of boosting labor demand for this group. But insiders might
use their political powers to resist such policies as well.
In a similar vein, how can we prevent increased labor supply of women from resulting
in higher unemployment for this specific group? In the United States, this problem has been
solved by the invisible hand, mainly in the market for private services, whereby the demand
for female labor has expanded. In the Nordic countries, a corresponding increase in labor
demand for women has been brought about via the visible hand of increased government
service production. Both “hands” have thus far been tied on the European continent.
Moreover, it is rather generally agreed that the widening of the dispersion of earnings
in the United States and the United Kingdom in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the widening
of the distribution of unemployment (in percentage points) in many countries in Western
Europe, is a result of changes in the composition of labor demand in favor of high-skilled
workers. Although some observers have referred to increased international competition for
labor-intensive products, the most generally accepted explanation is certainly that during this
period, Tinbergen’s (1975) celebrated “race between technology and education” was won by
the former. Dennis Snower and I (Lindbeck and Snower, 1996) have emphasized a third
explanation, namely that the ongoing reorganization of firms, including the decentralization
of authority and initiatives, has favored the demand for versatile workers, i.e., individuals
who are able to face up to increased responsibility (often due to idiosyncratic characteristics).
This explanation is consistent with the observation that wage dispersion has recently
increased also within narrowly defined educational groups, professions and job categories.
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This development also makes centralized wage bargaining relatively less attractive to
firms, since the reorganization of work increases job heterogeneity. It thus becomes difficult
to acquire appropriate information about job characteristics on the central level and hence
also to set appropriate wages from an efficiency point of view. Since centralized wage
bargaining often results in a squeeze of wage differentials, shifts to more decentralized
bargaining are likely to accentuate the tendencies toward wider wage dispersion (Lindbeck
and Snower, 2001a). However, since relative wages would then be better adjusted to the
composition of demand and supply of various types of labor (more “market-conforming”
wages), tendencies toward a wider dispersion of job opportunities and unemployment are
likely to be mitigated.
2 A hard-line believer in the technological explanation is perhaps tempted to argue that the reorganization of
firms is simply a subset of technological change. Even with this terminology, the explanation in terms of
reorganization of work would still be of interest in clarifying what type of technological change is behind the
recent widening of the dispersion of earnings and job opportunities. This explanation also emphasizes the role of
versatility rather than just technical skills.11
There is no doubt that these developments in the labor market complicate the
egalitarian ambitions of the welfare state. So far, however, in countries with elaborate
welfare-state arrangements, the dispersion of the distribution of disposable income has
increased considerably less than the distribution of earnings (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 2000;
Atkinson, 1999b, 2000). On this account, the welfare states in Western Europe have had
some success in counteracting tendencies toward a wider dispersion of income.
The standard policy prescription to counteract tendencies toward a wider dispersion of
wages is to stimulate education and training of low-skilled workers by selective education
subsidies so that the supply of high-skilled rises relative to the supply of low-skilled workers.
To begin with, this would stimulate social mobility, thereby also enhancing equality of
opportunity, since some previously low-skilled workers would become high-skilled. The
long-term effect of selective education subsidies on social mobility is a more complex matter.
It is stimulated by greater economic resources for investment in education among families
with low factor income, which has been characterized as a shrinking “distance effect” in the
literature (Hassler et al., 2001). But this effect is counteracted by a negative disincentive
effect on education because of smaller wage differences.
General educational subsidies (to all income groups), as opposed to targeted subsidies
to low-skilled individuals, have even more complex effects on social mobility. It has been
argued by Hassler et al. (2001) that such subsidies tend to stimulate education among the
well-to-do more than among other groups, since the former use larger resources than other
groups for education. However, it has been argued by others (Nickell and Bell, 1997) that a
rise in the general level of education helps individuals to adjust to changes in the composition
of labor demand in favor of high skills. This is likely to dampen tendencies to increased
relative wages for high-wage groups when the composition of labor demand shifts in the
favor of the latter group. Perhaps better education also makes workers more versatile, which
would further mitigate tendencies toward a wider dispersion of wages as a result of the
reorganization of work. However, to the extent that versatility depends on an innate
idiosyncratic ability to accept responsibility, take initiatives and cooperate with others,
education and training will not be sufficient to prevent a widening of the dispersion of
earnings and job opportunities in connection with the contemporary reorganization of work
within firms.
Recent changes in types of labor-market contracts have also contributed to more
heterogeneity in the labor market. Nowadays, there is a bewildering mixture of permanent
(“indefinite”) work contracts, fixed-period (temporary) work, project work, bonus systems,
stock options, etc. For instance, while workers on fixed-term contracts were probably quite
few in Western Europe during the first decades after World War II, the current EU average is12
13 percent, with the highest figure for Spain (33 percent) (Eurostat, 1998a). By allowing
fixed-term contracts, the hiring of outsiders is likely to be boosted in business upswings.
However, as pointed out by Bentolila and Bertola (1990), temporarily employed workers also
function as an “employment buffer” for insiders, which further strengthens their job security
and market power.
1.3 The unemployment experience
It is well known that during the last quarter of the 20
th century, Western Europe has
been less successful in promoting full employment than in mitigating tendencies toward a
wider dispersion of disposable income – presumably partly because of its highly
institutionalized, centralized and regulated system of wage formation, which would be
expected to constrain relative wage flexibility. This has not only undermined the welfare state
financially. It has also sharpened the insider-outsider divide in society – contrary to the idea
that the welfare state should contribute to social integration.
Moreover, while traditional welfare-state arrangements protect pensioners quite well
against income risks, such risks have instead begun to increase for young and elderly workers
and their families – via high unemployment in the former group and dropout from the labor
force in the latter (partly via early retirement). During the last two decades of the 20
th
century, the youth unemployment rate (individuals in the age group 15-24) has typically been
about 15-20 percent in most countries in Western Europe. Exceptions are countries with well-
developed apprentice systems, such as Austria, Germany and Switzerland, where the rate has
oscillated between 5 and 10 percent. Spain and Italy are extreme cases in the opposite
direction; their rates have recently hovered in the interval of 20-30 percent. As mentioned
earlier, employment rates for elderly workers (55-64 years old) have become as low as 40
percent in the EU as a whole (OECD, 1999).
The reverse causation, from the welfare state to unemployment, is a more
controversial issue. It is unavoidable that both equilibrium unemployment (the natural rate or
the NAIRU) and unemployment persistence (prolonged deviations from the equilibrium rate)
may be accentuated by certain types of welfare-state arrangements. Obvious examples are
high subsidies of non-work, such as generous and long-lasting unemployment benefits, social
assistance (“welfare” in US terminology) for unemployed workers without work
requirements, and poverty traps in connection with means-tested benefits. There are certainly
strong ethical (distributional) justifications for such benefits. But the more generous the
benefits and the longer they may be kept, the greater the risk that they reduce active job
search and job acceptance, in particular when administration is lax – a well-known example
of moral hazard. Sufficiently generous subsidies of non-work may also raise the wage costs13
for low-skilled workers by boosting the reservation wage, with similar unemployment
consequences as in the case of (sufficiently) high minimum wages. However, there is a
stronger element of “voluntary” unemployment in the former than in the latter case. These
general comments are not very controversial. What is controversial is the quantitative
importance of these employment effects, and hence the intensity of the conflict between
ambitions to provide income support in connection with non-work and a desire to fight long-
term unemployment.
The consequences of job-security legislation are an even more complex issue, since
such legislation increases the costs of both hiring and firing workers, with ambiguous direct
effects on the average unemployment rate over the business cycle. More specifically, this
type of legislation tends to stabilize (un)employment at the level that happens to exist. If the
economy is initially close to full employment, unemployment tends to be stabilized at a low
level; this was the situation in most West European countries in the period 1955-1975. The
welfare implications are grimmer if unemployment is high initially, for instance, as a result of
a recent negative macroeconomic shock, such as in the period 1975-2000. In this case
unemployment was stabilized at a high level.
But this is not the end of the story about the unemployment consequences of job-
security legislation. Since the market power of “insiders” (incumbent workers) in the labor
market is augmented by such legislation, wages are boosted and the demand for workers
reduced. If these negative indirect effects on labor demand are sufficiently strong, the
average unemployment rate over the business cycle would increase even if the direct effects
are not negative, or even positive (Lindbeck and Snower, 2001b). Legislation that enhances
the bargaining power of unions will accentuate these effects – for instance, laws and
regulations that extend collective agreements to non-union workers and non-union firms, and
that facilitate sympathy strikes, blockades and picketing. I then assume that unions are more
concerned about the welfare of insiders than of outsiders.
Regardless of whether job-security legislation increases equilibrium unemployment or
not, there is no doubt that it increases unemployment persistence, i.e., that movements either
away from or toward the equilibrium unemployment rate decelerate. Indeed, I have argued
elsewhere that the prolonged period of high unemployment in Western Europe during the
1980s and 1990s had more to do with high unemployment persistence than with an asserted
increase in the equilibrium unemployment rate (Lindbeck, 2001).
Unemployment persistence may be the result of behavioral adjustments of either
outsiders or insiders, or both. It is well known that outsiders’ possibilities of returning to
work tend to fall by the length of their unemployment spells. This is one reason why both
job-security legislation and long-lasting unemployment benefits tend to increase14
unemployment persistence. Losses in skills and self-confidence also reduce the re-
employment of outsiders. It is often also hypothesized that low investment in real capital
during prolonged periods of recession result in sluggish demand for labor in the aftermath,
which may also reduce the demand for labor and contribute to unemployment persistence.
But adjustment of insider behavior can also contribute to unemployment persistence. One
conceivable mechanism is that insiders will use their market powers to push up wages in a
subsequent business upswing without much concern for the employment prospects of
outsiders, which reduces the willingness of firms to hire workers.
Unemployment persistence may be further accentuated by endogenous changes in the
work ethic and social norms in conjunction with long periods of mass unemployment. In a
short- and medium-term perspective, ethics and social norms in favor of work, and against
living on benefits, are likely to constrain the disincentive effects on work of labor-income
taxes and subsidies of non-work. But this inertia is likely to recede if a large fraction of the
population is unemployed for long periods of time, assuming that social norms are upheld by
the approval or disapproval of employed workers. Thus, the greater the number of individuals
who live on benefits, the more socially accepted we would expect this way of life to be
(Lindbeck, 1995; Lindbeck, Nyberg, Weibull, 1999). Here, then, is another potentially
important mechanism behind unemployment persistence. This is reflected in common talk
about “unemployment cultures”, although we do not know much about the quantitative
importance of this asserted phenomenon.
Needless to say, some welfare-state arrangements may instead reduce structural
unemployment. The most obvious example is the school system. An upgrading of general
skills among low-skilled workers presumably helps them to get jobs, at least if there are
effective wage floors because of high minimum wages or high reservation wages due to
generous transfers to individuals out of work. Thus, the existence of wage floors, which in
themselves may contribute to unemployment among unskilled workers (if the floor is high
enough), strengthens the case for policy actions to improve the education and training of low-
skilled workers.
Reduced payroll taxes for low-skilled workers is another strategy to boost their
employment prospects in the case of rigid money wages. But since such subsidies are reduced
when the individual acquires more skill, they necessarily imply increased implicit marginal
taxes on investment in human capital. This, of course, may be counteracted by higher
education subsidies. In this sense, employment subsidies and education subsidies are
complements rather than substitutes.
So-called active labor market policy might also be expected to mitigate structural
unemployment via better matching between jobs and workers, which is likely to reduce both15
the equilibrium unemployment rate and unemployment persistence. A large number of
studies, however, indicate that the quantitative effects of such policies are quite limited
(Calmfors, Manning and Saint-Paul, 1998; and Katz, Stanley and Kruger, 1998).
3 One
specific problem with so-called “active” labor-market policy is that it facilitates the
manipulation of unemployment statistics. Simply by putting a book in the hands of all
unemployed workers, and calling them students or trainees, “open” unemployment could in
principle be reduced to zero without any increase in regular employment. Moreover, not only
workers with early retirement but frequently also “discouraged” workers are often removed
from labor-force statistics. This means that the employment situation in a country is often
better described by the fraction of individuals of working age who are employed –
“employment rates” for short -- than the unemployment rate. While these rates were about the
same, approximately 65 percent, in most OECD countries in the early 1960s, the figures have
recently diverged considerably. In the United States and the Nordic countries, the rates had
reached the interval 70-77 percent by the end of the 1990s, while the EU average had fallen
to about 58 percent.
The exclusion of outsiders from the labor market is accentuated by a weakening of
their social network. The division of workers into insiders with good and stable jobs and
outsiders with recurrent periods of (often prolonged) unemployment, or work in the informal
sector, also has wide repercussions outside the labor market. Since outsiders have smaller
economic resources than insiders, they are often forced to abstain from social activities
enjoyed by others. Moreover, many important welfare-state entitlements and subsidized
services are tied to current or previous work, which contributes to the exclusion of outsiders
from such welfare-state arrangements. In particular, youngsters without a foothold in the
labor market often have to rely on quite ungenerous, often means-tested social assistance –
when they do not live on handouts from their parents. Here then is a clear example of a
conflict between incentives and distributional aspects. On the other hand, when expected
future benefits are (positively) tied to work, such benefits have positive incentive effects on
work, which counteracts various work disincentives of taxes and means-tested benefits.
Conditions in the housing market may also contribute to social exclusion. There is
always a general tendency toward segregation in the housing market based on income
differentials. A specific type of segregation may arise, however, in urban housing markets
with rent control and a related housing shortage (excess demand for apartments), i.e., a
3 It could be that these studies underestimate the long-term positive employment effects of such policies. More
specifically, it is at least conceivable that unemployed workers involved in active labor-market programs, such
as training and public works, do not lose their skills and work habits as fast as do openly unemployed workers.
If so, active labor-market policy may make the supply of skilled labor more elastic in subsequent booms,16
division between housing-market insiders, with direct apartment contracts, and housing-
market outsiders without such contracts. In this situation, apartments are mainly acquired via
personal networks and black market transactions. Low-income groups, including many young
people and immigrants, then have particular difficulties in securing direct apartment
contracts. We would also expect a positive correlation between being an outsider in the labor
market and the housing market.
The punch line of this discussion about new tendencies in the labor market is that the
welfare state has a long way to go in order to adjust to changing tides in the structure of the
labor market.
2. Changes in the Family
2.1 Household types and life cycle
The ambitions of the traditional welfare state to protect male-breadwinner families
against income losses explain its emphasis on full employment, unemployment insurance,
sick-leave insurance and pensions for the breadwinner and his survivors in case of death.
Recent changes in household structure, life cycle, and values make this type of welfare state
less relevant than it used to be. In particular, the male-breadwinner household now constitutes
less than a third of families in most developed countries (Mclanahan, Casper and Sorensen,
1995, Table 11.3). Two-earner households constitute (on average) about 40 percent of
households in the Nordic countries and about 25 percent in Southern Europe (Italy and
Spain), with other countries in Western Europe in-between, usually about 30 percent
(Luxembourg Income Statistics). Single-parent households now average 14 percent of
households in EU countries, ranging from 7-8 percent in Greece and Spain to 23 percent in
the UK (Eurostat, 1998b).
While two-earner households exhibit relatively little poverty, it is well documented
that households with a single adult, in particular with children, are highly exposed to
economic distress, and even poverty. For instance, child poverty in one-earner households is
often three or four times as frequent as the corresponding rates in two-earner households
(Mclanahan, Casper and Sorensen, 1995; Bradbury and Jäntti, 2001). A basic reason is that
labor-force participation among single adults with children is low in most countries. Another
reason is that returns to scale in household service production cannot be exploited in such
households. Moreover, there are no adult household members with whom to pool income
risk. Indeed, besides long-term unemployment, single parenthood seems to be the most
thereby contributing to lower structural unemployment in later upswings. So far, there is not much systematic
empirical information about such conceivable long-term effects.17
important socioeconomic factor behind poverty, including child poverty (Esping-Andersen,
1999, pp.161-163).
Although explanations of the rise in single parenthood are manifold, it is obvious that
various welfare-state arrangements also have an impact. There is a strong ethical case for
government support to single parents – in fact, females account for 84 percent in Western
Europe (Eurostat, 1998b) – not least to mitigate child poverty. But it is unavoidable that
women then find it financially easier to become single mothers, via childbearing as well as
divorce – an obvious example of moral hazard of welfare-state policies. It is also likely that
social norms against being a single mother have weakened in recent decades. There is
probably mutual causation in this case: while weaker norms against being a single mother
result in more of them, more single mothers are likely to weaken the norms.
The generosity of welfare-state support to single motherhood differs considerably
among countries. On the European continent and in the United States, such support is usually
modest, and mainly confined to transfer payments. In the Nordic countries, not only are
transfers more generous; they are also combined with priority for single mothers to receive
strongly subsidized child care outside the household. The latter, of course, helps explain the
high labor-force participation of single mothers in these countries. For instance, more than 80
percent of single mothers in Sweden worked in the early 1990s, while the EU average was 68
percent and the figure for the British Isles only about 50 percent. The situation in the United
States is not much different, about 45 percent (Gornick, 1994). The question of how the issue
of single motherhood should be dealt with politically is a complex and controversial issue.
The policy trend is to require them to work or acquire education and training, which often
presupposes subsidized child care.
Another aspect of the increased heterogeneity of households is a tendency of
individuals to choose a less “linear” life cycle between education, work and non-work than
earlier. Specifically, individuals tend increasingly to shift back and forth between periods of
work, studies, sabbatical, work abroad, etc. One explanation may be that higher income in
society results in increased diversity of individual “life projects”, similar to the way increased
income results in more diversity of product demand. But it is also likely that preferences and
attitudes are gradually undergoing change in the sense that individuals want to realize
idiosyncratic life projects with given income. Such “individualization” of preferences may be
a result of higher education and/or demonstration effects from other countries. It is clear that
traditional welfare-state arrangements, based on the assumption of a linear life cycle, are too
inflexible to satisfy the needs and desires of individuals today to finance periods of non-work
for reasons other than bad health, unemployment or old age.18
Moreover, pensions are often tied to income earned late in working life, such as in
the last ten or fifteen years of work. In a society with income fluctuations over the life cycle,
sometimes with particularly high income early in life, such arrangements are not appropriate.
From this point of view, there is a stronger case than before to tie pensions to lifetime
income, or lifetime contributions, rather than to income late in working life.
Increased family instability in many countries after World War II has also created
problems for social-insurance entitlements. The traditional system was largely designed to
protect widows and their children. But since females increasingly have their own income
from work, the need for special social-insurance benefits for widows has declined. Here a
delicate normative issue is how fast pension rights for widows should be phased out. (In
Sweden, out-phasing has been so rapid that many widows – a group with little political clout
– have become severely disadvantaged). Instead there is a growing social problem for
divorcees when one partner (usually the woman) has not yet accumulated much pension
claims. The reason is that pension claims are usually not split between spouses in the event of
separation – even less so between other types of cohabitants. In some cases, this is bound to
create economic hardship in old age for at least one partner. Here, then, is another example
where contemporary welfare-state arrangements are not well adjusted to today’s social
conditions.
Recent socioeconomic changes also have important implications for housing policy.
Greater instability of family structure – due to divorce, remarriage, changes in cohabitation
patterns and ambitions among the young to set up housekeeping on their own – has made rent
control, with a resulting “housing shortage” (excess demand for housing), a more severe
social problem than earlier. Unstable families require a flexible housing market, which
presupposes equilibrating rents (“market rents”) with a reserve of empty apartments (of a few
percent) at every point in time.
2.2 Individual responsibility
Another idea that seems to be gaining popularity among politicians involves
encouraging greater individual and family responsibility – a parallel to the increased
responsibility recently given to individual workers in reorganized firms. This tendency may
be seen as a reaction against the paternalistic notion that the government, in popular jargon,
should take care of an individual from “cradle to grave”. One example concerns the earlier
discussed proposals to shift, completely or partially, to fully funded pension systems with
individual accounts and individual choice of portfolio manager. A more radical proposal,
designed to give the individual more responsibility for his own income security, is to replace
the many different types of welfare-state arrangements currently in effect with a unified19
system of compulsory saving with individual accounts and “drawing rights” (Fölster, 1999;
Orzag and Snower, 1999). The characteristic feature of such a system is that an individual
would be allowed to draw on his account before retirement for certain specified purposes,
such as education, sabbatical, sick leave and unemployment. What remains in the account at
the time of retirement would determine the size of his pension. Thus, an individual would
have greater freedom than today to reallocate welfare-state entitlements over the life cycle
according to idiosyncratic preferences. This reform fits nicely both with individuals’ desire to
choose a less linear life cycle than before and with suggestions to create more individual
responsibility. For the time being, the most obvious real-world example of such a system is
the central provident fund in Singapore.
The new emphasis on “work-fare” rather than “welfare”, not just for single mothers,
is another of attempt to boost individual responsibility. More generally, politicians and policy
advisors seem to be increasingly sympathetic toward shifting away from policies that
subsidize non-work. There is a tendency either to take a neutral stance regarding the choice
between work and non-work (as in the case of lump-sum transfers) or, more frequently, to
adopt policies that actively promote work (as in the case of employment subsidies or tax
credit for low-wage groups).
Even leaders of traditional leftwing parties, such as the UK Labor Party, have recently
emphasized the individual’s responsibility for his own economic situation. Some leaders of
the Democratic Party in the US, including the Clinton Administration, have expressed the
same view; indeed, this vision is behind the 1997 social assistance reform in the United States
– designed to abolish “welfare as we know it” in President Clinton’s words. Though
macroeconomic efficiency would clearly be improved by such a shift, the consequences for
the financial position of the government are less clear.
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2.3 Welfare-state services
I have already pointed out that changes in family structure – in particular, the growing
incidence of two-earner households and single-parent households – are bound to increase the
demand for new types of welfare services, such as child care and old-age care. Baumol’s law
certainly will raise aggregate health-care and old-age care spending as a share of GDP. It is
also conceivable, though far from established that increased longevity and advances in
4 The effects depend partly on the elasticity of labor demand with respect to real wage costs. While some
authors, such as Sinn (2000), have argued that the financial position of the government will improve, others
such as Burtless (1994), assert that the opposite is likely to be the case.20
complex and resource-intensive medical care tend to work in the same direction.
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Moreover, old-age care needs cannot be fully transformed into effective demand without an
expansion of old-age care insurance or tax-financed old-age care. To satisfy varying
individual needs and preferences, and to allow considerable freedom of choice, insurance
systems are required at least as a complement to tax-financed, rationed old-age care.
Another potentially important future problem in the health sector is how to use
emerging genetic information about individuals. Should this, and will it, be used to
differentiate health insurance premium and priority among individuals in hospital queues?
In some countries, again notably the Nordic nations, subsidies to welfare services are
currently much higher when produced in the public rather than the private sector. As a result,
personal (human) services – education, health, child-care and old age care – have largely
been socialized in these countries. But the tax system favors home production of services in
general – including repairs, cleaning and gardening. As a result, while the production of
personal services in these countries has moved from families to the public sector, a number of
“material services” have shifted from the market to the household (Lindbeck, 1988). Karl
Marx would have been surprised by this combination of socialized household production of
personal (human) services and a shift of various material services from the market to the
household – at the same time that manufacturing production has remained in the private
sector.
It is not obvious why governments in some countries thus appear to have created near-
public-sector monopolies for important personal services. One conceivable explanation is that
such policies tend to change the distribution of income to the disadvantage of high-income
families that choose to buy non-subsidized private services, at the same time as they have to
pay taxes to finance services for others. They then have to “pay twice” (Besley and Coate,
1991; Blomquist and Christiansen, 1995). Another explanation may be that public-sector
service monopolies make it easier for politicians and public-sector administrators to control
type, quality and distribution of such services. But why would a majority of voters support
such arrangements, which largely do away with individual freedom of choice in these areas?
Maybe only a small minority of voters are concerned about freedom of choice for services
such as child care and old-age care, in particular if most families are basically content with
the quality of government-produced services. The absence of freedom of choice may be a
serious concern only for a small minority of voters, including those adhering strongly to the
principle that individuals should be free to choose.
5 A study in Sweden suggests that the per capita cost of in-house health care is about six times higher during the
six last years of life than for the average citizen (Lagergren and Batljan, 2000). Indeed, individuals above 75
years of age account for a very large fraction of total health spending.21
However, higher income and better education as times go by are likely to increase
households’ interest in obtaining more individually adjusted services and hence more
individual freedom of choice in the future. Again, this would be a parallel to the observed
high income elasticity of demand for product variability in the case of private goods and
services. As a result, welfare states that favor public-sector service monopolies are likely to
be less and less in touch with the values of a large number of their citizens.
As we know, it is not difficult administratively to combine freedom of choice with
subsidies to “social services”. Service checks (vouchers) allow households to buy services
wherever they like, or to cash the checks and take care of their own children or elderly
parents themselves. A usual argument against such reform is that it may increase institutional
segregation along the lines of parental income and education. But if there is considerable
housing segregation, service vouchers will give low-income families living in geographical
areas with poor service institutions a chance to acquire services from better institutions in
other geographical areas – today a privilege mainly confined to the rich. Vouchers may then,
in fact, contribute to institutional desegregation of education and old-age care services.
But vouchers may certainly give rise to segregation in the school system in terms of
ability – “meritocracy” – since public-sector schools may lose some of their best students.
However, the net effect of vouchers on public-sector schools is not necessarily to harm their
quality since increased competition is likely to stimulate all schools to improve their
efficiency and adjustment to children’s needs and parents’ wishes. Indeed, a comprehensive
study in Sweden suggests that the quality of education in public-sector schools has been
stimulated by competition from private schools, so called “free schools” (Bergström and
Sandström, 2001). It is not obvious why the case for freedom of choice, competition and
innovation (experimentation) should be weaker in these areas than in the case of ordinary
consumer goods. There is, however, a difficult political question of whether individuals
should be allowed to add cash payments to the vouchers to obtain more expensive education
for their children.
Contemporary changes in information and communication technology (ICT) are also
likely to have important consequences for public-service production. Trivially, ICT reduces
the individual’s costs of acquiring information about public-sector activities, including rules
concerning social insurance and welfare-state services. The Web also enables individuals to
learn from the experiences of others regarding specific public-sector services, evaluated from
the consumer’s point of view. ICT also makes it cheaper to administrate individually
adjusted, and hence more differentiated, social insurance systems, including both pension
systems with individual accounts and compulsory saving with individual drawing rights.22
Moreover, new fora gradually emerge on the Internet whereby individual citizens
can express their opinions not only about goods in the private sector, but also about specific
public-sector services – such as child care, education, health care and old-age care at specific
institutions. An individual will be able to air his views not only on the Web site of politicians
and public–sector institutions, but also at non-government sites: virtual communities, news
groups and chat groups managed by independent agents. When many individuals openly
express their views in cyberspace, politicians and public-sector administrators will find it
difficult to neglect complaints and suggestions (Lindbeck and Wikström, 2000).
In other words, the Internet is likely to enhance the individual’s “voice option”
regarding public-sector service. This is important since voting is a very inefficient way of
voicing opinions about specific public-sector services, such as a particular school or child-
care institution. After all, general elections only enable an individual to comment on broad
“packages” of policy measures proposed by political parties or individual candidates. A better
voice option via the Internet would be even more powerful if it were accompanied by an
expanded exit option. Correspondingly, an exit option is more valuable if the individual is
well informed, for instance via the Web. Thus, voice options by way of the Web and exit
opportunities by way of voucher systems are highly complementary mechanisms.
2.4 Family orientation vs. service orientation
The developments discussed above – concerning family structure, life cycle and
values – challenge both the family-oriented, transfer-heavy welfare states on the European
continent and the more public-service-oriented welfare states in the Nordic countries. The
former type of welfare state infringes on the ambitions of females to participate in the labor
market, and hence also to achieve more independence in relation to the “male breadwinner”.
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The fact that birth rates today are not higher in these countries than in countries with higher
labor-force participation among females suggests that low labor-force participation among
females is no guarantee for high fertility. The availability of child care outside the family is
likely to mitigate the conflict between female labor-market participation and child rearing
(Esping-Andersen, 1999, pp. 67-72).
Generally speaking, the Nordic welfare states are better adapted than family-oriented
welfare states to the ambitions of females to participate in the labor market. But the “cost” is
high tax rates and, in reality (though not by necessity), also strongly restricted freedom of
households to choose a service provider. In practice, these countries also exhibit strong
6 Child care by parents and other relatives is important in all countries. Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 64) reports
that such child care accounts for about 30 percent of total child care in Denmark, 50 percent in the US and 83
percent in Britain – and probably the lion’s share also in Germany, Italy and Spain.23
gender segregation in the labor market – a concentration of females in the public sector and
men in the private sector. For instance, in Sweden 51 percent of the female labor force work
in the public sector, and 73 percent of the employees in this sector are females (Statistics
Sweden).
Some advocates of Nordic-type welfare states regard generous transfers to households
as instruments for making individuals less dependent on the labor market – a “de-commoda-
tion" of individuals in Marxian jargon (Polanyi, 1944). But somewhat paradoxically, it is
precisely in this type of welfare state that married (and cohabiting) women are actually
“commodized”, since their high labor-force participation makes them directly dependent on
the labor market (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Moreover, a common assessment is that families
with two adult labor-market participants often find that time is extremely scarce, a point
made forcefully long ago by Burenstam Linder (1970). Married females have adjusted to this
dilemma not only by working part-time but also by cutting the number of hours of work in
the home as compared to housewives (Esping-Andersen, 1999, p. 629).
The question of what would be an appropriate strategy for welfare-state reforms from
a normative point of view depends, of course, on what type of society we strive to realize. For
instance, ambitions among females to participate in the labor market cannot be satisfied
unless households obtain outside services for child care and old-age care. One way of
achieving this is through a US-type strategy of high flexibility (and wide dispersion) of
relative wages, possibly combined with negative income taxes associated with work (such as
“work-in-benefits” or tax credit to individuals with small earnings). Another way is the
Nordic strategy of generous subsidies to child care and old-age care outside the household. In
turns out that total social spending (public-sector plus private) does not differ dramatically
between these two types of countries even though the proportions between government and
private financing and provision differ considerably (Forsell et al., 2000; Esping-Andersen,
1999, pp.175-178).
3. Macroeconomic Developments: Instability, Growth and
Internationalization
3.1 Short-term macroeconomic instability
Recent experiences of short-term macroeconomic fluctuations in developed countries
also provide interesting lessons for the welfare state. The traditional Keynesian view, of
course, was that generous welfare-state arrangements help reduce cyclical fluctuations since
disposable income is held stable by the “automatic fiscal stabilizer”. This theory is still
relevant in the case of modest business cycles. However, recent experience, for instance in24
Finland and Sweden, suggests that the automatic fiscal stabilizer may turn into an
automatic de-stabilizer in the case of huge negative macroeconomic shocks. In particular, this
may happen in countries where the budget balance is very sensitive to changes in
macroeconomic activity, which is the case in countries with highly ambitious welfare-state
arrangements. There are at least two reasons for such a destabilizing effect. If the budget
deficit and, as a consequence, public-sector debt explode, lenders may lose confidence in the
government’s ability to service the galloping debt. They then require higher – possibly much
higher – interest rates, with restrictive macroeconomic effects as a result. The crowding out
of private spending may then be much larger than that predicted by traditional static
Keynesian (IS-LM) models (where the crowding-out effect can never be larger than the initial
stimulation of aggregate demand via a higher budget deficit).
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Another reason why galloping government debt during a recession may have
restrictive rather than expansionary macroeconomic effects on the national economy is that
households may lose confidence in the government’s ability to grant promised welfare-state
entitlements. A predicted effect is a rise in the household saving rate – possibly an even
stronger rise than according to the “Ricardian equivalence” hypothesis. This also tends to
deepen a recession.
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In the case of both lenders and potential beneficiaries of transfer payments, the
asserted restrictive effects of galloping government debt are related to destabilization of
expectations. It is conceivable that recent experiences of galloping public-sector debt have
made both types of agents more aware of these and other political risks. In this sense, private
agents have become more forward looking than before – perhaps even without having read
the literature on rational expectations! All this means that the harmony which used to be
assumed between the welfare state and macroeconomic stability, in the Keynes-Beveridge
tradition, has been shattered to some extent (Lindbeck, 1997a).
3.2 Economic growth
The fall in long-term economic growth from the mid-1970s is another important
macroeconomic experience of considerable relevance for the contemporary welfare state. The
large increase in the budget deficits in most developed countries in the 1970s and 1980s is
most realistically perceived as the result of this slowdown. While the development of the tax
base became more sluggish, various welfare-state entitlements continued to expand since they
7 In the early 1990s, real interest rates on private loans in Finland and Sweden increased to 10-15 percent.
8 Again, the severe macroeconomic crisis in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s is an example. For instance,
in the early 1990s, the household saving rate increased from minus three to plus 9 percent, which corresponded
to a fall in aggregate demand for domestic output by about 7 percent. The difficulties in stimulating household
consumption via budget deficits in Japan in the 1990s may be a similar phenomenon.25
are often based on earlier macroeconomic development. This experience simply illustrates
that the financial viability of the welfare state in a medium-term perspective is crucially
related to the macroeconomic growth rate.
But what about the possibility of reverse causation – from the welfare state to long-
term economic growth? The most obvious example of positive growth effects, at least during
a period of transition, is probably government subsidies to investment in human capital –
education, training programs and health care (though perhaps not in the case of retired
individuals). It is also generally believed that income protection contributes to social accord,
and that this in turn promotes economic growth by preventing disruptive social conflicts.
Indeed, there is some empirical support for this hypothesis (Alesina et al., 1996). It has also
been argued by Hans-Werner Sinn (1996) that increased income security provided by various
welfare-state arrangements promotes economic growth, since entrepreneurs will incur smaller
risk. This cannot possibly be a decisive point. The big risk for entrepreneurs involves losing
their equity capital, and welfare-state arrangement or taxes do not compensate for such risks.
As a rule, the probable alternatives for entrepreneurs are to start a new firm or accept
becoming an employee rather than living on welfare-state benefits, such as unemployment
benefits or social assistance.
The most widely quoted welfare-state arrangement with negative effects on GDP
growth, at least during a period of transition, is probably the introduction of pay-go social
insurance systems, since the overcompensation to the first generations of pay-go pensioners
increased their consumption and hence reduced aggregate saving. Moreover, as pointed out,
in particular by Martin Feldstein (1995), existing capital-income taxes are likely to have
depressed physical capital formation over a number of years. Various asymmetries in such
taxes also distort the allocation of investment among sectors and firms, with negative effects
on economic growth. Similarly, progressive taxes on earnings are likely to have reduced the
incentives to invest in human capital, hence counteracting the positive effects of various
educational subsidies on such investment. The net effects of these changes would be expected
to be negative for economic growth, at least during a period of transition.
I would also hypothesize that these effects will be particularly pronounced if welfare-
state egalitarianism spreads to the business sector. An example is attempts by the government
to squeeze profits as part of redistribution policy, since real investment then tends to fall. If
the government, as in Sweden during the 1960s and 1970s, responds to such a fall by
selective subsidies to ailing firms, the allocation of resources is bound to be distorted, and
economic efficiency and (at least during a period of transition) the growth rate to decline. A26
combination of double taxation of profits, high wealth taxes and high inheritance taxes is
also likely to harm the entry and expansion of small firms.
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The basic issue, however, is not whether the welfare state as a whole boosts or retards
economic growth, but rather at what level of welfare-state arrangements, and related
financing, the negative effects of additional spending start to dominate the positive effects.
This way of looking at the issue is evidently based on the observation that the marginal
disincentive effects of explicit and implicit taxes increase with the initial rates, and the
assumption that the growth-enhancing effects of additional welfare-state spending do not rise
indefinitely by higher government spending. This is the background for the familiar
hypothesis of a non-linear (concave) relation between welfare-state spending and economic
growth, with an internal maximum point. It is also generally understood that the
consequences of welfare-state arrangements (and their financing) for economic growth
depend crucially on the exact design of these arrangements – a point forcefully made, for
instance, by Atkinson (1999a).
The non-linearity of the effects of government spending on economic growth lends
doubtful value to many linear regressions of this relation in the literature. Any chance of
discerning the consequences of government spending on economic growth in countries with
high spending requires a sample restricted to such countries, usually with rather high per
capita income. However, because of the complex relation between government spending and
economic growth, and the many factors that may influence the latter, we should be skeptical
of all highly aggregate studies in this field.
10
9 Indeed, in Sweden during the 1960s and 1980s, tax rates on capital investment by owners of small firms were
often close to, or even higher than, one hundred percent in real term. I have hypothesized that this “extension”
of redistribution policies to the business sector was an important explanation for the slow growth in Sweden
relative to other countries during the last quarter of the 20th century (Lindbeck, 1997b).This policy was
gradually abandoned in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
10 Recent studies, which are confined to countries with high per capita income, include Fölster and Henrekson
(2000). Both studies report a strongly negative and quite roust negative relation between public-sector spending
and economic growth.
∗ I am grateful to Jon Dutrieux Anderson and Alessandra Bonfiglioli for help in
collecting data. Anders Björklund, Peter Heller, Richard Musgrave and Solveig Wikström provided useful
comments on a draft of the paper.
10 According to projections by the EU Secretariat, the rules in effect in the early 1990s imply that the average
age-dependency ratio (the number of retirees relative to the number of individuals of working age) will increase
by 50 percent between the mid-1990s and 2020 in the EU area (European Community, 1994).
10 A hard-line believer in the technological explanation is perhaps tempted to argue that the reorganization of
firms is simply a subset of technological change. Even with this terminology, the explanation in terms of
reorganization of work would still be of interest in clarifying what type of technological change is behind the
recent widening of the dispersion of earnings and job opportunities. This explanation also emphasizes the role of
versatility rather than just technical skills.
10 It could be that these studies underestimate the long-term positive employment effects of such policies. More
specifically, it is at least conceivable that unemployed workers involved in active labor-market programs, such
as training and public works, do not lose their skills and work habits as fast as do openly unemployed workers.
If so, active labor-market policy may make the supply of skilled labor more elastic in subsequent booms, which
may then keep down structural unemployment at that time. So far, there is not much systematic empirical
information about such conceivable long-term effects.27
3.3 Internationalization
How much then has the welfare state been influenced by the gradual
internationalization of markets? It is self-evident that the ability of governments to control
domestic interest rates has dwindled, and that as a result the risk of higher interest rates has
increased in the case of galloping public-sector debt. It is also obvious that the possibilities of
taxing capital much higher in one country than in other countries have recently receded
considerably, and that this may generate “downward tax competition” in the case of capital-
income tax rates. Revenues from capital taxes, however, usually comprise only a few percent
of total government tax revenues. Thus, the main problem with the loss of national autonomy
in capital taxation is not that it becomes more difficult to finance the welfare state. Negative
consequences for domestic capital accumulation are a more severe problem. This is the case,
in particular, for small and medium-sized firms that cannot easily borrow on international
capital markets.
The consequences of increased internationalization of product and labor markets are
more complex. To the extent that the internationalization of product and labor markets is
responsible for the recent widening of the distribution of earnings in some countries, it has
certainly become more difficult to realize egalitarian welfare-state ambitions. A long time
ago, Gunnar Myrdal (1968) pointed out that countries with generous welfare-state
arrangements and strongly egalitarian ambitions could be expected to pursue quite restrictive
immigration policies in the case of low-skilled individuals. The planned enlargement of the
EU is likely to increase the pressure for immigration of low-wage workers to Western
Europe. Against this background, some authors, such as Hans-Werner Sinn (2000), have
suggested that benefits for immigrants from areas outside Western Europe should be tied to
the benefit levels in their home countries, rather than their host country. A motive is to reduce
downward benefit competition among West European countries.
10 The effects depend partly on the elasticity of labor demand with respect to real wage costs. While some
authors, such as Sinn (2000), have argued that the financial position of the government will improve, others
such as Burtless (1994), rather assert that the opposite is likely to be the case.
10 Child care by parents and other relatives are important in all countries. Esping-Andersen (1999, p. 64) reports
that such child care accounts for about 30 percent of total child care in Denmark, 50 percent in the US and 83
percent in Britain – and probably the lion’s share also in Germany, Italy and Spain.
10 In the early 1990s, real interest rates increased to 10-15 percent on private loans in Finland and Sweden.
10 Again, the severe macroeconomic crisis in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s is an example. For instance,
the household saving rate increased in the early 1990s from minus three to plus 9 percent, which corresponded
to a fall in aggregate demand for domestic output by about 7 percent. The difficulties to stimulate household
consumption via budget deficits in Japan in the 1990s may be a similar phenomenon.
10 This policy was gradually abandoned in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
10 Recent studies, which are confined to countries with high per capita income, include Fölster and Henrekson
(2000), who report a strongly ntive and quite roust negative relation between public-sector spending and
economic growth.28
So much for capital and (low-skilled) labor. It is more difficult to judge whether
national autonomy has dwindled much, or is likely to do so in the future, in the case of
taxation of human capital. Certainly, several factors have increased the mobility of human
capital: internationalization of firms (including increased importance of multinational firms),
improved knowledge of foreign languages among younger generations and better information
about conditions in other countries. Thus, the risk that countries with high and strongly
progressive taxes will face a brain drain has certainly increased. While countries have some
control of immigration of low-skilled workers through quantitative regulations, attempts to
counteract emigration of high-skilled individuals have to rely on other methods, including
economic incentives. An individual’s choice of country of residence, however, does not
depend mainly on marginal tax rates, but rather on his total tax burden relative to total
benefits received. It is mainly this relation governments should consider when worrying
about brain drain in connection with welfare-state policies. However, it is too early to say
whether much more coordination and centralization of welfare-state and tax arrangements
among rich countries are necessary in order to limit brain drain and downward tax
competition in the case of human capital.
There is, however, another way of looking at the increased obstacles for national
governments to raise taxes in a more internationalized world economy. For instance, these
obstacles may be seen as protection of minorities against threats of being “robbed” by a
majority. Considering various “imperfections” in the political process, also in democracies,
these obstacles may alternatively be regarded as protection of a majority of voters against
non-representative politicians trying to exert ever more political powers.
Closer international integration of labor markets has also strengthened the case for
making social insurance entitlements internationally transferable – a parallel to attempts to
make occupation pensions transferable among production sectors in the domestic economy.
One way of bringing this about is to base entitlements on individual accounts that the
individual can take with him when shifting his domicile from one country to another. While
such accounts are typical for fully funded benefit systems, internationally transferable
notional accounts can be constructed in the context of pay-go systems.
4. Concluding Remarks
From the point of view of the welfare state one important development in the labor
market is concerns changes in demography. The most pressing policy adjustment in this
context seems to be arrangements that raise the average pension age and facilitate
employment of workers in the 55-70 age group. There is a strong case for policy measures
that mitigate the emerging insider-outsider divide in society, for instance, by reducing the29
market power and privileges of insiders and by enfranchising outsiders. Additional policies
that enhance more flexible relative wages and higher labor mobility would also help mitigate
unemployment persistence.
Changes in the labor market are clearly intertwined with changes in family structure. I
have emphasized the well-known shift from “one male-breadwinner families” to a structure
dominated by two-earner families, combined with a high frequency of families with a single
adult. The most important consequences of these developments for the welfare state are
perhaps new needs for personal services outside the household. Increased family instability,
greater heterogeneity of life cycles and greater diversity of needs for income protection and
personal services also have important consequences for the welfare state. In the long run,
political pressure for greater freedom of choice concerning types of income protection and
personal services will probably also emerge. The ICT revolution provides new tools for such
individual adjustments, based on a combination of stronger voice and increased exit options
of individuals by way of voucher systems.
Changes in the macroeconomic environment also require adjustments of welfare-state
arrangements. There is certainly a case for making the budget balance less sensitive to large
macroeconomic changes – if we are concerned about the destabilization of expectations
among lenders and households. The traditional economist’s concern about disincentive
effects that harm economic efficiency and economic growth should also be taken seriously, at
least in countries with high marginal tax rates and highly asymmetric taxes for different
sectors and different production activities.
How then have countries with different welfare regimes responded to “changing
tides” for the welfare state? In most countries, not much has yet been done to adjust the
welfare state to new income risks and new service needs. The Nordic countries are an
exception in the case of support of families with small children. This is an important
explanation as to why labor-force participation in these countries is as high as in the United
States, where it is kept up by wide wage dispersion and relatively low taxes for potential
buyers of private services. In one important respect, however, the Nordic countries have
moved closer to the welfare-state regimes on the European continent: benefits have recently
been tied more closely to contributions already paid, rather than constituting “citizens’ rights”
independent of contributions.
In the UK, there has been a pronounced shift from universal to means-tested benefits.
Levels have also been reduced considerably, for instance, in the unemployment benefit
system. In the United States, the level of social protection fell gradually during the 1970s and
1980s. For instance, the value of social assistance (aid to families with dependent children,
AFDC) dropped to a quarter of average earnings by 1989, and the percentage of unemployed30
workers receiving insurance benefits declined from about 70 percent in the mid-1970s to
33 percent in 1989 (Moffitt and Jovanovic, 1990, p. 210). During the same period, the
minimum wage dropped to less than 40 percent of average earnings. Thus, there has been
some dismantling of the welfare state in both major Anglo-Saxon countries.
Countries on the European continent, emphasizing transfers rather than services, have
instead continued to expand transfers during the 1980s. Recently, however, some of these
countries have reduced the generosity of certain benefit systems, such as in the case of early
retirement (Italy and Holland).
One explanation for the difficulties in adjusting welfare-state arrangements to new
socioeconomic conditions and new values is, of course, that the demand for new
arrangements has to compete with established programs for which there already exist interest
groups, often with strong political influence. In line with Khaneman-Tversky-type theories, it
is also natural to assume that voters who lose benefits that they already have will be more
perturbed than are voters who do not secure new benefits. Hence the risk of losing votes
among the former is probably greater than possibilities of gaining votes among the latter. The
outcome is either that new arrangements will not develop in response to new demands (the
situation in the UK and in most countries on the European continent), or that new
arrangements are piled on top of the old ones, resulting in very high tax rates (the Nordic
“solution”).31
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